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IMMORTALITY DISCUSSED.
BY E. P. POWELL.
Some time ago we agreed to discuss tlie question
of immortality. Is this hope of man anything more
than a wish or a desire ? It has, so far as I know, never
been demonstrated.
To demonstrate immortality is to make it certainty
to rational minds—not to prove it by the senses.
Certainly; but what has a beginning can have an
end ; and we know that our lives do have a point of
beginning.
They most assuredly do not. They have a point
of beginning to operate the organism called the body
—
a mere flux of atoms. But the life in which we share
is without beginning. We do not need to repeat our
argument that nothing can originate al/ nihilo.
But that proves only that our egos are of the Eter-
nal Mind, and may either go back into the Infinite, or
go forward in an infinite chain of causations.
Have you ever thought what your own life is—ex
cept as a chain of causations? You are not what you
were twenty years ago. You barely remember a few
scraps of your life of that date—most of it is forever
lost to your power to recall. If it were obliterated
your happiness would hardly be affected.
But do you not mean to say immortality is at best
only eternal sequences; and we live at only one of
these at a time—and that to be immortal only means
I am constantly being blotted out for another 1 ? And
what I now am is really nol to live on ?
Clearly j'ou have a power to beget a successor self
—and he another—and so on ad infinituin. It is the
indestructibility of the power to beget that we contend
for.
This seems to me to rob immortality of all its glory
and value. Will our friendships inevitably fade ? and
our loves ?
Except as they hourly beget new love they most
assuredly do fade. That is the fate, as you well know,
of most friendships—lacking power to relive in new
purpose and conception.
But immortality as generally taught is something
quite different, I am sure. It is essentially to live for-
ever in a second life ; not a continuity of lives. To
believe in such a great future far ahead of this world-
life is held to be all-important.
It is doubtful if such a belief has been of any value
whatever to men either morally or intellectually. Ac-
cepted not as a first choice, its value has invariably
been associated either with extravagant and unwhole-
some joys or with terrible fears. This has enablea
the priest to take as his favorite stand the threshold
of undying existence, and by pictures of bliss and pic-
tures of misery to buy the services of his hearers or
terrify them into submission.
You hold then that the essential immortality is the
power—indeed the necessity of change. ]\\- die that
another we may live. But why may not this genera-
tion of selfs cease? Even allowing that evolution is
eternal, is it provable that man holds any more cer-
tain place than that missing link, which for ages ex-
isted, and then was so absolutely obliterated that we
cannot find its record even among the fossils?
For thousands of years evolution has proceeded hy
means of man, and there are no signs of an)' higher
organism ahead. With man began a reign of moral
purpose. The secret of eternal life lies in our ethical
being. He that wills ethically becomes one with the
eternal Ethical Purpose. The question is, whether
our spirits do by free choice enter into the immortal
life of truth and love which is indestructible. The
true conception of immortality is that of a survival of
the fittest. While we are the fittest by our own re-
solve, there is no power in nature to undo us. There
is every reason to believe that man is the object
reached after by organic evolution. Henceforth the
end will be ignorance surmounted by man, weakness
mastered by man, ideals touched— "God in man."
I have been accustomed to read Tennyson with
considerable pleasure, but of late with less satisfac-
tion. It is a puzzle to me that religious people seem to
believe that the ver)' best hope and faith they can get
is found in such passages of In Memoriam as
" I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all
;
And faintly trust the larger liope."
This is not faith ; it is not knowledge ; it is hardl)'
hope. Is this all that we have reached in our reason-
ing and soul-reachings? The whole thing is in a nut-
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shell. I am a child of God. God is my Father. We
have love one for another. He will not fail me ; I
will not fail Him. I stand as firm as God, because I
stand with God. My friend, no one yet has ever got
beyond the sublime truth, "I and my Father are
One." Only we need to see that this is true of every
up-looker on earth. But if one will take in all of In
Memoriam from first to last he will find the real im-
mortality in such a passage as this :
" So many worlds, so much to do !
So little done, such things to be !
How know I what had need of thee,
For thou wert strong as thou wert true ?
But there is more than I can see
;
And what I see I leave unsaid,
Nor speak it. knowing Death has made
His darkness beautiful with thee."
But let me go back to your valuation of immortal-
ity as a theoretical power. I am surprised that you
consider it of no great value as a belief in affecting an
amelioration of human character. I have been accus-
tomed to think with those who consider the value of
a belief in another life as among the highest motives
to virtue.
Agnosticism is a mental flatulence that I do not in-
tend to encourage in myself or others ; but there is
such a thing as neglecting more important knowledge
for less important. It has been the history of man-
kind that to undertake to live for anotlier life has been
largely at a sacrifice of good wholesome living of this
life. It has led to contemptuous creeds concerning
this world, the body, and our duties here and now.
To save the soul in a next existence has involved a
furious struggle, and rituals abhorrent to humanity.
The inquisition was born of this doctrine. It abolished
humanity; and the French Revolution, reacting, abol-
ished Divinity.
A good This-worldliness is then what you advocate
in place of other-worldliness.
Yes, a person may live accursedly for this life, or
he may live accursedly for the next life. The all-im-
portant idea seems to be to live nobly and honorably
the days that are ours; and to comprehend that these
days are seeds determining the days to come.
CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION IN
FRANCE.
BY THEODORE STANTON.
Since the days of the Gauls, France has been
swinging like a pendulum between the two extremes
of centralisation and decentralisation. During the
past century the complaint has been frequently heard
that there existed "apoplexy at the centre and paral-
ysis at the extremities." This niol was so taking that
it has often been repeated, although the nation's le-
gal representatives under three different regimes—the
July Monarchy, the Second Empire, and the Third
Republic—have, since 1830, newly organised and
more broadly developed local self government in
France. Of course, much still remains to be done,
especially when the subject is viewed from an Ameri-
can standpoint. But as the pendulum is just now
oscillating in the direction of decentralisation, there
is fresh liope for still greater progress.
In fact, decentralisation is rapidly becoming a
"live question" in this country. The reviews and
newspapers are full of it, it is agitated in the Cham-
bers, it is the subject of lectures in various parts of
France. Mme. Adam's Nciivelle Revue has made it
one of the "features" of the renovation which that
periodical underwent last winter, and the "Chronique
de la Dt^'centralisation " and " Les Provinces" are
now regular departments in this progressive semi-
monthly. M. Marcel Fournier's new monthly, the
excellent Rcvin- Politique et Pailementaire, fairly teems
with the pros and eons—especially the former— of de-
centralisation. "Theoretically decentralisation is a
question that is more than ripe," said the Temps a
short time ago in a leader favoring the reform ; "fur-
ther discussion and more articles and reports threaten-
ing to add only waste paper to the already overwhelm-
ing mass of materials on this subject."
But perhaps the most significant of these many
fresh manifestations of this anti-centralising order is
the foundation at Paris of the National Republican
Decentralisation League. Senator de Marctre, the
veteran statesman who played an important part in
French public life during the critical days of Mac-
Mahon's presidency and who then showed himself as
Minister of the Interior a pronounced and practical
advocate of administrative decentralisation, is presi-
dent of the organisation, while its membership in-
cludes such men as M. Leon Say, the political econ-
omist; Senator Bardoux, the ex-Minister and Member
of the Institute ; M. Leon Bourgeois, ex-Minister and
Deputy; M. Flourens, Deputy and formerly Minister
of Foreign Affairs ; M. de Vogii6, Deputy and Member
of the French Academ}- ; Senator Adrien H6brard,
editor-in cliief of the influential and quasi-official
Temps; and M. Ren6 Goblet, Deput}' and ex Prime
Minister, who says in a recent note: "I am a rather
early partisan of decentralisation, for, when Minister
of the Interior in 1882, I introduced two bills on this
subject, one of which would have developed the or-
ganisation of the canton, and the other would have
handed over to the Councils General the authority
over the communes now exercised by the Central
Government; nor have I changed my mind on these
questions."
Just what are the reforms these men would accom-
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plish? In an "Address to our Fellow Citizens," is
sued liy tlie League, we read :
"On account of tlie abuse of functionaryism,
which is causing the ruin of our finances, and on ac-
count of the lack of local liberties which weakens the
force of the parliamentary regime, France is on the
point of succumbing to a fatal disease,—anemia, in
the provinces, and hj'pertrophN , at Paris. But the
growth of the evil has called attention to the pressing
need of reform, which, as it will save France and con-
solidate the Republic, ought to be demanded energeti-
cally by the country at large."
The principal remedy which these doctors in poli-
tics offer for the trouble is "administrative decentral-
isation," which strikes one as rather a mild dose for
such a deadly disease.
We are further told in this same Address that the
aim of the League is "to give life to the provinces
and to favor the blossoming forth of all the artistic,
literary, industrial, commercial, scientific, financial
and political forces which lie hidden in the provinces
and exhaust themselves by the enervation of inaction ;"
while the second article of the Statutes of the League
is more explicit in the statement of its purposes, which
are "to organise throughout the country a system of
decentralising propaganda, whose aim shall be a dim-
inution of the powers of the Central Government,
without, however, threatening national unity, but
rather strengthening it, and the increment of the
authority of the communes, the department and other
territorial divisions ; thus to contribute in the interest
of the French patric, to the awakening of local life in
all its forms, and to the development of public liber-
ties ; and to bring about, for this purpose, a reform
of the various administrative services."
But this extract from a letter of the secretary of
the League, M. Alfred Guignard, Editor-in-chief of
the Etcndard, gives the best account of the scope of
the work of the new society :
"We have not drawn up a definite programme,
lest it might awaken discussion and, consequently,
division among our members, each of whom is now
at liberty to propose and discuss, on his own respon-
sibility, any views which he may chance to hold on
this question, ranging from the most moderate kind
of decentralisation up to federalism, which, according
to my mind, is the true sort of decentralisation and,
at the same time, the true form for a republican gov-
ernment.
"The aim of the League is to awaken a pulilic sen-
timent .favorable to local liberties. This is to be ac-
complished b)' the formation of branch societies in all
the departments, arrondissements, and cantons, even
;
by means of lectures, books and pamphlets devoted
to the principles of self-government of which we
French know so little. When a free expression of
opinion shall have lieen secured and these views shall
have been carefully examined; when a network of
branch societies shall have been spread over the whole
surface of France, then we shall convene a congress
and promulgate a platform whose acceptance we shall
try to secure from every candidate for an elective
office."
But it must not be concluded from the foregoing
accounts of this energetic revival of a decentralisation
crusade, that that rather sentimental dream and oft-
expressed hope of some French publicists, the restor-
ation of the old historic provinces, whose names still
live in popular speech and print though their boun-
dar\-lines were oliliterated over a himdred years ago,
will soon, if ever, be realised. "We do not think,"
writes M. Guignard in the letter from which an extract
has just been given, "that France, so backward in
the practice of liberty, and bowed for a century under
the disgraceful and humiliating yoke of bureaucracy,
is prepared for federalism."
It occurred to me that it would be interesting and
instructive, if some of the leaders in this movement
were to state brittly in writing their views on this
subject,—which several have been kind enough to do.
The divergencies of opinion revealed in these com-
munications
—
tot Juimiius, ijuot scntcntiic—prove the
wisdom of the League in leaving perfect freedom to
its members in the initiatory period of the organisa-
tion. I give two of them, and they are the most uni-
sonous of the budget.
One of the Vice-Presidents of the League, M.
Charles Beauquier, Deputy of the Doubs, writes:
"I understand b)- decentralisation the develop-
ment of local liberties and the extension of the powers
of the various elective bodies at the expense of those
monopolised by the Central Government. Thus, I
should have at the base a commune with a budget of
its own, a municipal council managing all municipal
affairs, and an executive committee, as in Switzerland,
sharing with it the various powers now exercised ex-
clusively by the mayor.
"After having suppressed the Council of Arron-
dissement and the Departmental Council, or General
Council, I should place between the commune and
the Central Government a Region, formed by several
of our present Departments and provided with a grand
Regional Council. A committee, chosen by this coun-
cil, would exercise about the same powers as those
enjoyed to-day b\- the Prefect. The sole dutj- of the
representative of the government at the capital of the
Region would be seeing that the laws were duly re-
spected. He might even be given a veto on the de-
cisions of the council, if it should infringe upon the
reserved rights of the Central Government.
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"The Central Government would have to care
only for general interests. Everything relating to local
matters would be managed by the municipal councils,
while Departmental and Regional affairs would be
treated by the Regional Councils. In this way the
State would realise a considerable saving of money,
for, instead of having a representative and all his sub-
ordinates at the capital of each Department, as is the
case to-day, there would be but one such establish-
ment in each Region, or group of Departments. If
this plan were adopted, it would be much the same
thing as restoring the old provinces."
After thus offering his panacea, M. Beauquier takes
this rather pessimistic view of the situation :
"To be exact, I ought to add that there is no
chance of decentralisation being realised at present.
The plan sketched above is a dream of the future,
although this sort of decentralisation exists in Italy
and Belgium. The question is not yet ripe enough
in France. During the last legislature I introduced
a bill whose purpose was to reduce notably the num-
ber of Departments; but it never got before the
House. All we can now hope for is to slightly cut
down the army of office-holders, to simplify adminis-
trative routine, and to augment in modest proportions
the powers of the Municipal and General, or Depart-
mental, Councils, at the expense of the authority of
the Prefects. That would be something. But we
cannot count on more, considering the state of the
public mind and the drift of the Government. For
my own part, however, I do not consider a republic
solidly established unless it enjoys decentralisation.
Centralisation is of monarchical essence."
Here are the views of M. Henry Maret, a leading
Deputy of the Extreme Left and Editor-in-chief of
the Radical:
"Being an impenitent liberal, I am a partisan of
the greatest possible decentralisation. Where exists
centralisation, I believe there can be neither liberty
nor a true republic. I consider that we could create
Regional Assemblies, invested with powers now exer-
cised by the Prefects, without endangering national
unity. As it would be difficult, with over 36,000 com-
munes, to realise communal autonomy, I would sub-
stitute for it cantonal autonomy. In other words, the
canton and not the commune would be the unit. To
my mind, parliament would gain in force and author-
ity if its attention were confined solely to grand na-
tional questions and if it left to the Regions and Can-
tons the care of their own administration. I should
even go so far as to let them decide how they should
raise their taxes. The republican regime will be in-
destructible only when political life circulates every-
where. Until then, we will always be at the mercy of
a coitp dc force. "
In a word, the present advocates of decentralisa-
tion in France declare that they desire in no wise to
lift the hand against national unity secured after so
much effort and waiting, nor to deprive the Central
Government of any of the authority necessary for the
defence of the country against foreign enemies and
for the preservation of order at home. They admit
that the laws should be uniform throughout the na-
tion, and that they should be uniformly enforced ; and
that the treasury and the army should be in the un-
trammeled control of the central power. Their attack
is directed only against the excesses of centralisation.
In France this theme is almost as old as the hills,
as M. Leon Aucoc, of the Institute, one of the most
learned of French authorities on administrative ques-
tions, has just shown in an instructive pamphlet (^Lcs
Coiitroverscs sur la Decentralisation Adiiiinistratiite:
Etude liisforiqtie) called forth by this revival of the
subject under discussion.
He describes how the Gallic cities possessed con-
siderable independence under the Romans prior to
the reign of Trojan ; how, after the anarchy out of
which the feudal system arose, there was a tendency
towards the reconstitution of central authority and
local liberties, at one and the same time ; how the
royal power finally destroyed these liberties and the
feudal system, till the king could truly say, L'Etat
c'est moi\ how, on the very eve of the French Revolu-
tion, there was a return towards decentralisation
;
how the Constituent Assembly of 1789, while continu-
ing the political centralisation of the old regime, in-
augurated so decentralising a policj' in administrative
affairs as to produce utter confusion, which the con-
vention checked and then went to the opposite ex-
treme ; how the first Empire carried still further the
centralising system ; how it was not till Louis Phi-
lippe's reign that the pendulum began to swing in the
other direction ; how the work of the Second Empire
in this field was " deconcentration," as M. Aucoc pre-
fers to call it, rather than decentralisation, and how
under the third Republic, within the last quarter of a
century, we have had examples of both excessive cen-
tralisation and excessive decentralisation.
A study of this past would seem to indicate that
France is, in fact, about to enter upon a decentralis-
ing period; for, though Taine unquestionably expres-
ses the sentiment of a large bod}' of Frenchmen when
he sa3's, "Authoritative centralisation has this that is
good about it,— it still preserves us from democratic
autonomy," the " nouvelles couches," whose coming
Gambetta announced, are slowly gaining the upper
hand and democratic autonomy is likely to be attained
along with that federative form of government which
advanced French republicans dream of, and of which
Proudhon wrote; " Wlio says liberty and does not
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say federation, says nothing; who says repubHc and
does not say federation, says nothing ; who says so-
ciaUsm and does not say federation, still sa)s nothing.
"
SOME DEFINITIONS OF INSTINCT.'
BY PROF. C. LLOYD MORGAN.
The phenomena of instinct are of interest both to biologists
and to psychologists; who respectively approach them, however,
from different standpoints. Whether the divergences of opinion
concerning these phenomena, and the diversities of definition of
the terms "instinct" and "instinctive," are mainly due to this
cause, it is perhaps difficult to decide. That marlitd differences
do exist is only too obvious.
I. Kelation of luslinct to Conscioiistiess.— " Instinct," says Pro-
fessor Claus,- " may be rightly defined as a mechanism which
works unconsciously, and is inherited with the organisation, and
which, when set in motion by external or internal stimuli, leads to
the performance of appropriate actions, which apparently are di-
rected by conscious purpose." Here, then, we ha\-e instinct de-
fined as essentially unconscious. Mr. Herbert Spencer "• regards
instinct in its higher forms as probably accompanied by a rudi-
mentary consciousness; but he does not consider the presence cf
consciousness essential. Professor Baldwin speaks'' of a "low
form of consciousness which has not character enough to be im-
pulsive"; while Professor Calderwood'^ holds that instinctive ac-
tivities cannot be attributed to mental power. " The entire chap-
ter on Instinct in Darwin's Origin of Species must," he says, " be
read in an altered form, consequent on the deletion of the ref-
erences to ' mental faculties ' "
On the other hand, Romanes commences his definition of in-
stinct with these words": "Instinct is reflex action into which
there is imported the element of consciousness. " ' ' The term com-
prises," he says, " all those faculties of mind which are concerned
with conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual ex-
perience." "The stimulus," he adds, " which evokes an instinc-
tive action is a perception." Professor Wundt also emphasises
the conscious accompaniments of instinctive activities, which, he
says,"^ "differ from the reflexes proper in this, that they are ac-
companied by emotions in the mind, and that their performance
is regulated by these emotions."
Thus, even if we exclude the extreme views of those who hold
that instinctive activity is due to connate ideas, and inherited
knowledge,'* there is a wide range of opinion on this head.
2 Kclalion of Insliiut to Iiiiptihi.—Prof. Wm. James speaks'-'
of "instinctive or impulsive performances." "Every instinct,"
he says, " is an impulse," and he implies that every impulse is in-
stinctive. Professor Wundt"' and Herr Schneider" also regard
instinctive activities as prompted by impulse ; the last-named au-
thor distinguishing between sensation-impulses, perception-im-
pulses, and idea-impulses. But other writers use the term in a
1 Reprinted from Naturat Science, of London, with subsequent corrections
of the author's.
2 Text-book 0/ Zoology, Eng. trans., \o\. I., p. 94.
?. Principles 0/ Psychology, Ch. XII.
\Text-booli of Psychology, Feelings and Wilt, p. 30a. He also speaks of
instincts as "inherited motor intuitions," p. 311.
',i Evolution, and Man" s Place in Nature, p. igo.
*3 Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 159.
"t Lectures on Human and Animal Psycliology, Eng. Trans., p. 401.
^Instinct and Acquisition. Nature, Vol. XII,, p. 507. Oct. 7, 1875. The
passage is quoted infra, p. 4636, § 6.
'y Principles of Psychology, Vol. II-. p. 3S2. See also the passage quoted
infra, p. 4636, ^ G.
1(1 Op. cit.
11 Der thierische U'ille.
more restricted sense Professor Hi''flding, though he holds' that
" instinct is distinguished from mere reflex movement by the fact
that it includes an obscure impulse of feeling," also tells us- that
"impulse [here used in the narrower sense] involves a contrast
between the actual and a possible or future. This," he adds, " is
what distinguishes it from reflex-movement and instinct, where
the excitation may perhaps cause a sensation, tut where no idea
asserts itself of what must follow." Professor Baldwin distin-
guishes'' between those stimuli and the reactive consciousness
which, as originating mainly from withirt, may be called in gen-
eral inipithii'ii, and those which, as originating mainly from with-
out, may be termed instiuitivc
; but he admits that the distinction
is inexact.
In introducing therefore into a desci iption of instinctive ac-
tivities any reference to impulse, the exact sense in which this
word is employed itself needs definition.
3. Relation of Insliiut to IntelligcniC and J'o/ition.—Mr. H.
Spencer describes ^ instinct as compound reflex-action. Although
he states clearly-"' that " the actions we call rational are, by long-
continued repetition, rendered automatic and instinctive"; yet his
main thesis is" that instincts are developed on the path of upward
development from reflex-action toward volitional activity. Others,
who are not prepared to follow Mr. Spencer in his main conten-
tion, still regard instinctive actions as essentially involuntary.
Such views may be contrasted with the opinions of G H. Lewes'
and Herr Schneider,'* who regard instinct as due to lapsed intelli-
gence ; habits formed under intelligent guidance being inherited
in the form of instincts. Professor Wundt seems to go yet further
when he says:" "Instinctive action is impulsive, ihat is voluntary
action ; and, however far back we may go, we shall never find
anything to derive it from except similar, if simpler, acts of will.
The development of any sort of animal instinct, that is to say, is
altogether impossible unless there exists from the first that inter-
action of external stimulus with affective and voluntary response
which constitutes the real nature of instinct at all .-^ tages of or-
ganic evolution." Thus, v hile Mr. Herbert Spencer regards in-
stinct as primarily not yet voluntary; and while many writers
regard it as no longer voluntary ; Professor Wundt asserts that it
is at no time involuntary.
4. Relation of Instinct to llalnl.—The word "habit," like so
many others in this connexion, is used in different senses. Many
writers describe all the activities of animals as their habits. In
this sense we speak of habit as correlated with structure But the
term is generally used in psychology in a more restricted sense,
and is applied to those activities which have become stereotyped
under the guidance of individual control. A habit is, in this ac-
ceptation of the terra, an acquired activity, the constancy of which
is due to frequent repetition by the individual, in adaptation to
special circumstances
;
and a distinction is drawn between such
habits, as individually acquired, and instincts as connate.'" Those
who accept the Lamarckian hypothesis of the origin of instincts
through " lapsed intelligence " regard them as the connate effects
of the inheritance of acquired habit. Darwin" and f-tomanes'- be-
i Outlines of Psycltology, p. 91.
2 Op. cit., p. 32::. Cf. also H. R. Marshall's Pain, Pleasure, and .Kstltctics.
pp. 275-277.
^Feelings and Will, p. 304.
^Principles of Psychology, Ch. XII., § 194.
5 Op, cit
,
§ 204.
6 0A "'.. § 211.
" Problems of Life and Mind, " Instinct."
^ Der thierisclte Wille,
'i Lectures on Human and Animal Psycltology, p. 409
10 See, for example. Professor Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. II., p. 184.
11 Origin ofSpecies, p. 206; Descent ofMan, \o\, I., p, 102, quoted in Mental
Ez'olution in Animals, p. 264.
Vi Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 200.
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lieved that instincts were in part due to this mode of origin. Pro-
fessor Wundt, however, gives to the term a wider meaning, and
so defines instinct as to include acquired habit. "Movements,"
he says,' "which originally followed upon simple or compound
voluntary acts, but which have become wholly or partly mechan-
ised in the course of individual life, or of generic evolution, we
term ins/inf/h'e a.ctions." In accordance with this definition, in-
stincts fall into two groups. Those, "which, so far as we can
tell, have been developed during the life of the individual, and in
the absence of definite individual influences might have remained
wholly undeveloped, may be called niqiiired instincts."- They
have become instinctive through repetition. " To be distinguished
from these acquired human instincts are others, which are con-
nate."" " The laws of practice suffice for the explanation of the
acquired instincts. The occurrence of connate instincts renders a
subsidiary hypothesis necessary. We must suppose that the phys
ical changes which the nervous elements undergo can be trans-
mitted from father to son. . . . The assumption of the inheritance
of acquired dispositions or tendencies is inevitable if there is to be
anv continuity of evolution at all. We may be in doubt as to the
extent of this inheritance: we cannot question the fact itself."''
" Darwin's explanation of the development of instinct as being
mainly the result of passive adaptation seems," says Professor
Wundt,'' " to contradict the facts." Now the majority of writers
on instinct distinguish it, as we have seen, from individually-
acquired habit. And it is hardly necessary to state that Professor
Wundt's explanation of the origin of connate instincts on La-
marckian principles, is not accepted by Professor Weismann and
his school. ' ' I believe, " says Professor Weismann,'' ' ' that this is
an entirely erroneous view, and I hold that all instinct is entirely
due to the operation of natural selection, and has its foundation,
not upon inherited experiences, but upon variation of the germ."
In view of the biological controversy as to the inheritance of ac-
quired characters, it would seem advisable so to define instinct as
not in any way to prejudge the question of origin.
5. The Instincts of Man.— " The fewness and the comparative
simplicity of the instincts of the higher animals, " said Darwin,'
"are remarkable in contrast with those of the lower animals."
Romanes'* held that "instinct plays a larger part in the psychol-
ogy of many animals than it does in the psychology of man."
"Recent research," says Professor Sully," "goes to show that
though instinctive movement plays a smaller part in the life of the
child than in that of the young animal, it is larger than has been
generally supposed." Professor Preyer'" tells us that "the in-
stinctive movements of human beings are not numerous, and are
difficult to recognise (with the exception of the sexual ones) when
once the earliest youth is past."
On the oiher hand. Professor \Vundt" regards human life as
"permeated through and through with instinctive action, deter-
mined in part, however, by intelligence and volition." And Pro-
fessor James tells us'- that "man possesses all the impulses that
they (the lower creatures) have, and a great many more besides."
The higher animals have a number of impulses, such as greedi-
1 Lectures on Human and Annual Psycliology, p. 388.
2 Op. cit., p. 397.
"Op.cit.,-f.VjH.
•I Op. cit., p. 405.
•> Op. cit., p. 409.
itEssays (1889), p. gi.
'Descent ofMan, Vol. I., p. loi.
H Mtntal Evolution in Man, p. 8.
'J The Human Mind, Vol. II., p. 1S6.
\r> Tlie Mind of the Child : " The Senses and the Will," p. 235.
11 Lectures on Hnvtan and Animal Psychology, p. 397.
\'i Principles 0/ Psychology, Vol. II., pp. 392, 3. Italics the author's.
ness and suspicion, curiosity and timidity, all of them " congenital,
blind at first, and productive of motor reactions of a rigorously
determinate sort. Each of them, then, is an instinct, as instincts
are commonly defined. But they contradict each other— 'experi-
ence' in each particular opportunity of application usually decid-
ing the issue. The animal that exliibits them loses the ' instinctive '
demeanour, and appears to lead a life of hesitation and choice, an
intellectual life ; not, ho7oei'er, because he has no instinct—rather
because he has so man}' that they block each other'' s path.'' This is in
tolerably marked contrast with the statement of Darwin's which
stands at the head of this section !
6. The Plasticity and Variability of Instinct.—"Though the
instincts of animals," said Douglas Spalding,' " appear and disap-
pear in such seasonable correspondence with their own wants and
the wants of their offspring as to be a standing subject of wonder,
they have by no means the fixed and unalterable character by
which some would distinguish them from the higher faculties of
the human race. They vary in the individuals as does their phys-
ical structure. Animals can learn what they did not know by in-
stinct, and forget the instinctive knowledge which they never
learned, while their instincts will often accommodate themselves
to considerable changes in the order of external events." It will
be noticed that there are here two groups of facts : (i) Variations,
analogous to variations in physical structure ; and (2) accommo-
dations to changes in the external order of events. Professor
James- says, "the mystical view of an instinct would make it in-
variable"; and he formulates two principles of non-uniformity of
instincts, (i) that of the inhibition of instinct by habits ; and (2)
that of the transitoriness of instincts. The variation analogous
to that of physical structure is not here explicitly recognised. Ro
manes, who defines'' instinct as a generic term comprising "all
those faculties of mind which are concerned with conscious and
adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience . .
. and sim-
ilarly performed under similar and frequently recurring circum-
stances by all the individuals of the same species," appears to lay
stress on their invariability; but his subsequent treatment^ shows
that he fully recognised the connate variability of instinct. Un-
der the head of " plasticity " he also''' insisted on " the modifia-
bility of instinct under the influence of intelligence " He quotes,
with approval, Huber's exclamation : ' ' How ductile is the instinct
of bees, and how readily it adapts itself to the place, the circum-
stances, and the needs of the community." There seems, how-
ever, some want of logical consistency in first defining instinct as
connate and antecedent to individual experience, and then imply-
ing that, as modified under the influence of experience, it still re-
mains instinct. For example, Romanes says'': "There is evi-
dence to show that the knowledge which animals display of poi-
sonous herbs is of the nature of a mixed instinct, due to intelligent
observation, imitation, natural selection, and transmission." Other
writers render the term "instinct" indefinite by including the ef-
fects of individual experience. Mr. A. R. Wallace, for example,
says' : " Much of the mystery of instinct arises from the persis-
tent refusal to recognise the agency of imitation, memory, obser-
vation, and reason as often forming part of it. Yet there is ample
evidence that such agency must be taken into account." But
would it not be well, one may ask, so to define instinct as to dis-
tinguish it from these agencies, and to say that the habits or ac-
lE. g., Douglas Spalding. "Instinct and Acquisition." Nature, Vol.
XII.p. 507.
^ Principles 0/ Psychology, Vol. II.. pp. 391-394.
^Mental Evolution in .Aniritals, p. 159.
<0p. cit., p. 190. C/. Darwin, in the same work, pp. 372 and 383.
^ Op. cit., p. 203.
GOp. cit., p. 227.
1 DarwiMism, p. 442.
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tivities of animals are of mixed origin, the term instinct being re-
served for particular types of connate activity?
7. The Pt-riodicity and Serial Xalure of Instinct.—Little need
be said on this head, since most writers recognise the facts as, at
any rate in many cases, characteristic of instinct. The sexual in-
stincts, nidification, incubation, and migration, exemplify the pe-
riodic nature of instinct ; and the fact that this periodicity involves
internal as well as external determination suggests the rejection of
Professor Baldwin's distinction between impulsive and instinctive,
not because it is logically incorrect, but because there is so much
overlap, many instincts involving an impulsive factor. That in-
stincts are very often serial in their nature and involve a chain of
activities is also commonly admitted, and is well brought out by
Herr Schneider.'
8. Suggested Stheme of Terminology.—From what has gone
before, it will be seen that there is a good deal of diversity of
opinion and of definition in the matter of instinct. Let us sum-
marise some of these diversities.
Instinctive activities are unconscious (Claus), non mental
(Calderwood), incipiently conscious (Spencer), distinguished by
the presence of consciousness (Romanes), accompanied by emo-
tions in the mind (Wundt), involve connate ideas and inherited
knowledge (Spalding) ; synonymous with impulsive activities
(James), to be distinguished from those involving impulse proper
(Hofiding, Marshall); not yet voluntary (Spencer), no longer vol-
untary (Lewes), never involuntary (Wundt); due to natural selec-
tion only (Weismann), to lapsed intelligence (Lewes, Schneider,
Wundt), to both (Darwin, Romanes); to be distinguished from in-
dividually acquired habits (Darwin, Romanes, Sully, and others),
inclusive thereof (Wundt); at a minimum in man (Darwin, Ro-
manes), at a maximum in man (James); essentially congenital (Ro-
manes), inclusive of individually-acquired modifications through
intelligence (Darwin, Romanes, Wallace).
It is scarcely probable that in the face of such divergence of
opinion unanimity is yet within the bounds of reasonable expecta-
tion, and the following scheme must be regarded as provisional
and suggestive. Certain points must be borne in mind in endeav-
oring to frame satisfactory and acceptable definitions of the terms
" instinctive " and "instinct." Since the phenomena are in part
biological and in part psychological, any definition should be such
as to be of biological value and yet such as to be acceptable to
psychologists. Since the question of origin is still sub judice, the
definition should be purely descriptive, so as not to prejudge this
question. And since the phenomena of instinct can only be
rightly understood in their relation to' automatism, congenital and
acquired, to impulse, to imitation, and to intelligence, our defini-
tion of instinctive activities should find a place in a scheme of
terminology. Such a scheme is here set forth.
It may be premised :
1. That the terms "congenital" and "acquired" are to be
regarded as mutually exclusive. What is congenital in its defi-
niteness is, as prior to individual experience, not acquired. The
definiteness that is acquired is, as the result of individual expe-
rience, not congenital.
2. That these terms apply to the individual. Whether what
is acquired by one individual may become congenital through in-
heritance in another individual is a question of fact which is not
to be settled by implications of terminology.
3. That the term "acquired" does not exclude an inherited
potentiality of acquisition under the appropriate conditions. Such
inherited potentiality may be termed "innate." What is acquired
is a definite specialisation of an indefinite innate potentiality.
4. That what is congenital and innate is inherent in the germ-
plasm of the fertilised ovum.
1 Der tliieris.he M'illc, e. g., p. 20S.
Our suggested terminology then is as follows :
Congenital fnovenients and aetivities : those, the definite per-
formance of which is antecedent to individual experience. They
may be performed either (a) at or very shortly after birth (connate),
or (/') when the organism has undergone further development (tle-
ferred).
Congenital .'lutonuilisiii : the congenital phy.';iological basis of
those activities the definite performance of which is antecedent to
individual experience.
Pliysiologitol rhyt/iiiis : congenital rhythmic movements essen-
tial to the continuance of organic life.
A'ejlex movements: congenital, adaptive, and co-ordinated re-
sponses of limbs or parts of the body; evoked by stimuli.
Pandom movements: congenital, more or less definite, but not
specially adaptive movements of limbs or pans of the body: either
centrally initiated or evoked by stimuli.
Instinctive activities: congenital, adaptive, and co-ordinated
activities of relative complexity and involving the welfare of the
organism as a whole ; specific in character, but subject to varia-
tion analogous to that found in organic structures; similarly per-
formed by all the like members of the same more or less re-
stricted group, in adaptation to special circumstances frequently
recurring or essential to the continuance of the race ; often peri-
odic in development and serial in character.
Imitative movements and activities : due to individual imitation
or similar movements or activities performed by others.
Impjilse ( 'Trieli): the affective or emotional condition, congen-
ital or acquired, under the influence of which a conscious organ-
ism is prompted to movement or activity, without reference to a
conceived end or ideal.
Instinct : the congenital psychological impulse concerned in
instinctive activities.
Control: the conscious inhibition or augmentation of move-
ment or activity. While the power of control is innate, its special
mode of application is the result of experience and therefore
acquired.
Intelligent activities: those due to individual control or guid-
ance in the light of experience through association (voluntary).
Motive: the affective or emotional condition under the in-
fluence of which a rational being is guided in the performance of
deliberate acts.
Deliberate acts: those performed in distinct reference to a
conceived end or ideal (volitional).
Acijuired movements, activities, or acts: those, the definite per-
formance of which is the result of individual experience. Any
modifications of congenital activities which result from experience
are, so far, acquired.
Acquired automatism: the individually modified physiological
basis of the performance of those acquired movements or activities
which have been stereotyped by repetition.
There is certainly some overlap in the definitions, and it is
difficult to see how such overlap is to be avoided. The physio-
logical rhythms—such as the heart-beat, respiratory movements,
and peristaltic action—are in part automatic, in the physiological
sense of orginating within the organ which manifests the rhythm ;
but they are also in part reflex. The line between reflex move-
ments and instinctive activities cannot be a very rigid one ; in-
stinctive activities are indeed in large degree organised trains or
sequences of co-ordinated reflex movements.
Although the psychological aspect of instinctive activities
falls under the general head of impulse, yet impulse is broader
than instinct—that is, if we adopt the definitions above suggested.
On the one hand, some reflex movements are probably accompa-
nied by impulse. On the other hand, when intelligent activities
pass into habits through repetition, the performance of these hab-
its is prompted by impulse. Impulse may, in fact, be either con-
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genital or acquired, and may be associated both with automatism
and with control. Instinct is a form of congenital impulse. As
such it may be counteracted or modified by an acquired impulse
due to pleasurable or painful experience. A chick, for example,
which has run after and seized a cinnabar caterpillar, acquires
through experience a counteracting impulse due to the disagree-
able effect. The congenital impulses, termed instincts, may thus
be modified by acquired impulses which result from experience;
but there is seldom or never a conflict of instincts, as these are
above defined.
Whether the objective activities termed instinctive are nl'vnys
accompanied by the subjective congenital impulse termed instinct
is a question which is open to discussion.
A wider definition of instinct by which it would be synony-
mous with congenital impulse may be suggested as an alternative
to that above given. This would, perhaps, be more in accord with
the popular use of the word " instinctive," but it appears to be
less saiisfactory as a definition of the technical term.
It is well to distinguish motives, as the determinants of delib-
erate acts, from the acquired impulses which are the determinants
of intelligent activities as above defined. As the intelligent ac-
tivity is often the outcome of a conflict of impulses, so is the de-
liberate act the outcome of a conflict of motives.
Imitative activities are due to an imitative impulse. Some of
them are probably involuntary and due to congenital impulse ;
but others are certainly due to intelligent imitation. They form
a group sufficiently well-defined to warrant the distinct place as-
signed to them in the suggested scheme.
The habits of animals are in very many cases of complex ori-
gin. It is claimed that such a scheme of terminology as is above
suggested may serve to aid us in discriminating between the sev-
eral factors, instinctive, imitative, and intelligent. The fact that
many instinctive activities are subject to modification through
imitation and experience clearly indicates that they at least are
accompanied by consciou.sness. But it is submitted that, when
thus modified, they cease to be instinctive, that is, if congL-nitalis
to take its place as an integral part of the definition of instinct.
They should be termed habits.
The distinction between congenital, on the one hand, and
acquired, on the other hand, is a definite one. Objectively con-
sidered, those activities, the performance of which is, so far as
they are concerned, antecedent to and irrespective of individual
experience and guidance, are congenital, no matter at what stage
of life they are performed ; while those activities, or modifications
of activity, which are performed as the result of individual ex-
perience, are acquired—any modification of congenital organic
structure correlated therewith being an acquired character. Sub-
jectively viewed, those impulses which are nowise dependent on an-
tecedent experience of pleasure or pain are congenital ; while those
which are due to individual experience are acquired. In any given
case of animal habit it may be difficult to determine how far it is
due to congenital activity, and how far there is acquired modifica-
tion. But this difficulty is more likely to be overcome by obser-
vation and experiment, if the exact terms of the problem are kept
clearly in view.
NOTES.
We are in receipt of a beautiful Buddha statue which was
sent by the Rev Shaku Soyen, of Kamakura, Japan. The statue
is a piece of exquisite art, made by an unknown artist of the last
century. It is carved wood, delicately emblazoned with gold, and
stands in a lacquered shrine about one foot high. The calm and
noble attitude of Buddha gives evidence of both the artistic taste
and the religious devotion of the Japanese artist. We here ex-
press publicly our heartiest thanks to the distinguished Buddhist
priest for his kind remembrance and beautiful gift.
Dr. Eduard Reich is a prolific writer who discusses the prac-
tical sides of social, religious, and philosophical questions in simple
and straightforward language and with considerable scientific
knowledge. His latest production is now in our hands under the
title of rhilosopJiif, Scflc-, Dnsein iiiu/ Eleiul (Amsterdam and Leip-
sic : August Dieckman), constituting Vol. II of his PJiilnsopliiial
Reflexions ami Sltidifs in Ilygienie Soiioloi^y. Dr. Reich's distinc-
tive point of view is the hygienic. The close connexion of spir-
itual with bodily and social health is his main theme, which is de-
veloped in all its multitudinous aspects. Dr. Reich stands aloof
from the accredited scientific circle of Germany, but his books are
full of suggestive if not striking ideas, simply presented.
A new monthly magazine devoted to university interests and
general literature, under the title of Bachelor of Arts, published
its first number in May last. Mr. Walter Camp will edit the ath-
letic department, Mr. W. D. Howells will write literary critiques,
Mr. Albert Stickney will contribute articles on political and eco-
nomical questions, and others equally well known are expected to
contribute. The Baclielor of Arts gives every indication of attain-
ing a high standard of excellence, and should be widely patronised
by college men. (15 Wall St., New York.)
SWINBURNE.
BY CHARLES ALVA LANE.
Incarnate Son of Song, 'mid battles born
Of Freedom's womb ! whose bosom menward yearns
From crystal heights where manhood's lordship spurns
The shackling shams of grievous dogmas worn
From erring eld ! who, voiced as with the morn.
Before the portal of the morrow turns,
Singeth, Apollo-like, a song that burns
With sovereign Soulhood round a faith forlorn !
We hail thee o'er the sea, where Liberty,
Like Memnon touched, gives echo to thy song.
And Art, with palms prest, pants in ecstasy
Amid thy wafted wealth of melody.
Whereof hath prescient music dreamed for long.
With sense that hearkened toward the sphery throng.
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